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Electronic Surveillance: A New Weapon
for California Law Enforcement in the
War on Drugs
In 1872, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code Section
640, which made nonconsensual eavesdropping and wiretapping a
felony.' Notwithstanding the prohibition in section 640 against non-
consensual eavesdropping and wiretapping, section 640 failed to
address whether evidence gained by police through these illegal means
was admissible. 2 Then, in 1955, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Cahan3 held that evidence gained by police through illegal
wiretapping is inadmissible in any judicial proceeding. 4 Recently,
however, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill (S.B. 1499) 5
and Senate Bill 83 (S.B. 83),6 both of which permit state law
enforcement officers to obtain judicially authorized warrants7 to
conduct surreptitious electronic surveillance in the investigation of
certain drug related offenses.8 Additionally, S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83
1. 1872 CAL. PENAL CODE § 640.
2. Id.
3. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
4. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 445, 282 P.2d at 911. Cahan's conviction for violating the
bookmaking laws was based on evidence gained by a listening device that the government
covertly planted in his home. Id. at 435, 436, 282 P.2d at 905, 906.
5. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629-631).
6. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1374, see 1, at - (amending Penal Code §§ 629.32, 631).
7. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629)
(information required to be included in application for authorization to conduct a wiretap
search); Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02) (requirements that must be satisfied before
a judicial order to intercept wire communications may be issued).
8. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02(a)(1)). The drug offenses include the im-
porting, selling, transporting, manufacturing, possessing for sale, or the selling of a controlled
substance containing PCP, methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine or their analogs where the
substance exceeds 10 gallons by liquid volume or 3 pounds of solid substance. Id.
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make evidence gained through a judicially authorized wiretap admis-
sible in any judicial proceeding. 9 Because the statutes permit non-
consensual wiretapping they may be subject to challenges based on
the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the United States Constitution and the right to privacy
guaranteed by the California Constitution. 10
Part I of this note discusses the legal background of electronic
surveillance in California by focusing on applicable state and federal
statutes and judicial decisions." Part I also briefly discusses the
twenty year political struggle to pass a wiretap statute in California.
2
Part II discusses the procedure and constitutionality of newly enacted
S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83.13 Finally, Part III discusses the legal ramifi-
cations of these newly enacted Senate bills.
14
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. State Law Regarding Electronic Surveillance and the
Admissability of Wiretap Evidence
In 1872, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code Section
640, the first statute to prohibit any person from surreptitiously
intercepting telegraphic communications.'5 In 1905, the legislature
amended California Penal Code section 640 to include prohibiting
any person from surreptitiously intercepting telephone communica-
tions. 6 In an attempt to keep up with modern advances in technology
and law, the legislature later enacted other statutes prohibiting the
9. See id. (enacting CAL. PENAl. CODE § 629.22) (a defendant may only move to suppress
evidence gained through judicially authorized wiretapping as a violation of the defendant's
right against illegal search and seizure under the fourth amendment); 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1374,
sec. 1 at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b)) (evidence of crimes, other than the
enumerated drug offenses, that are intercepted may not be used to prevent a crime unless: (1)
The evidence came from an independant source; or (2) the evidence would have inevitably
been discovered).
10. See, U.S. CONST. amend IV.; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
11. See infra notes 15-79 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 101-238 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 238-264 and accompanying text.
15. 1872 CAL. PENAL CODE § 640, (the penalty for violating section 640 could have been
a sentence of no more than five years imprisonment in the state prison, up to one year
imprisonment in the county jail, a fine of up to five thousand dollars, or both a jail sentence
and a fine).
16. 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 78, see 1, at 689-691 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 640).
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unauthorized installation of dictograph 7 machines and the recording
of confidential conversations of people in governmental custody.
8
But California wiretap statutes did not provide criminal defendants
with an exclusionary remedy at criminal trials. 19
Until 1955, the California courts were silent about the admissability
of evidence the government seized through illegal wiretapping. Then,
in 1955, the California Supreme Court in People v. Cahan20 held
that evidence the government seizes through illegal wiretapping in
violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
is inadmissible in any judicial proceeding. 2' In Cahan, police officers
entered the defendant's home without a search warrant and placed
a microphone under a chest of drawers located in the defendant's
bedroom. The microphone was attached to a recording device in a
nearby garage.2 For one month the police recorded all conversations
picked up by the hidden microphone. 24 The police then repeated the
same procedure at the home of the defendant's co-conspirator .2 The
government used the recorded conversations as evidence to convict
the defendant of conspiracy to engage in horse-race bookmaking.
26
The California Supreme Court recognized that almost all the
evidence introduced at trial was gained by police in violation of the
federal and state Constitutions as well as state and federal statutes.
27
The court believed that California courts in the past had essentially
participated in lawless activity by admitting illegally obtained evi-
dence.28 In so holding, the Cahan court adopted the federal exclu-
sionary rule introduced in Weeks v. Colorado,29 which prevents the
government from securing convictions supported by evidence the
17. A dictograph is a telephonic instrument with a small, sensitive, easily concealed
transmitter used for listening to or recording conversations in another room. WEBsTER's THmn
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986).
18. See 1941 Cal. Stat. ch. 525, sec. 1, at 1833 (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h)
(prohibiting the installation of dictographs) and 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1879, sec. 1 at 3285 (adding
Cal. Penal Code § 653i) (prohibiting the recording of any conversation between a person in
custody and that person's attorney, religious advisor, or licensed physician).
19. See supra notes 11-14.
20. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
21. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
22. Id. at 436, 282 P.2d at 906.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 437, 282 P.2d at 906.
26. Id. at 436, 282 P.2d at 905-906.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
29. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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police gained through illegal means. 30 Later, in 1963, the legislature
codified the exclusionary rule adopted in Cahan by enacting Califor-
nia Penal Code section 653j.3 1 Section 653j prohibited the government
from introducing evidence gained through nonconsensual wiretapping
in any legislative, administrative, or judicial proceeding.
2
Apparently responding to rapid improvements in the equipment
and techniques used to intercept wire communications,33 the Califor-
nia Legislature enacted the California Invasion of Privacy Act of
1967 (Privacy Act).3 4 The Privacy Act revised California wiretapping
law by adding criminal and civil penalties for wiretapping violations."5
Section 631 as enacted by the Privacy Act prohibited any form of
nonconsensual wiretapping or the use of evidence obtained by non-
consensual wiretapping. 6
B. Federal Law Regarding Electronic Surveillance and the
Admissability of Wiretap Evidence
The United States Supreme Court first ruled on the constitutionality
of wiretapping in 1928. In Olmstead v. United States,3 7 the Court
held that the government's electronic surveillance was not a search
and seizure under the fourth amendment. 8 In Olmstead, federal
prohibition officers placed wiretaps on telephone lines in the basement
of the building where the defendant's business was located. 9 They
30. See Cahan at 44 Cal. 2d 445, 282 P.2d at 911, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33
(1949) (the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence under the fourth amendment is enforceable
against the states under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment for federal crimes;
however, states are not required to adopt the exclusionary rule).
31. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1886, sec 1, at 3871 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 653j). But see
1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1509, sec. 9, at 3589 (repealing Cal. Penal Code § 653j).
32. Id.
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (Vest Supp. 1988) (legislative findings and intent). The
legislature did not intend to further restrict the use of electronic surveillance equipment by
law enforcement officers. Id.
34. 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1059, sec 1, at 3584 (repealing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 640, 653i,
653j and enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.5).
35. See id.
36. See 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1509, sec. 1, at 3584 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 631). See
also People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 270, 522 P.2d 1049, 1056, 114 Cal. Rptr, 241, 248
(1974) (the purpose of the Privacy Act is to protect the privacy of California citizens from
non-consensual wiretapping); Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 187, 194, 583 P.2d 737,
742, 148 Cal. Rptr. 883, 888 (1978) (in enacting the privacy provisions of the Penal Code the
legislature clearly chose to protect the citizens of California from surreptitious interception of
wire communications).
37. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
33. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
39. Id. at 457.
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also placed wiretaps on telephone lines outside the defendant's home.4
While placing the wiretaps, the government officials never trespassed
on any property owned by the defendant.41 Through the use of these
wiretaps the government gained information that uncovered a major
international criminal conspiracy.4 2 The government also used the
information to convict the defendant in federal district court of
conspiracy to import, transport, and possess for sale intoxicating
liquors .43
The Olmstead opinion focused on the traditional common law rule
of trespass" in holding that the fourth amendment was not violated
unless there was a search and seizure of a person, a person's material
effects, or a physical invasion of a person's home or curtilage with
the intent to make a seizure. 45 Consequently, the Olmstead Court
held that the actions of the federal prohibition officers were not a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
46
In addition, the Court allowed the federal goverment to use the
evidence obtained through wiretapping to prosecute the defendant
despite a state statute prohibiting wiretapping.41
In the wake of Olmstead, Congress passed the Federal Commu-
nications Act of 1934 (FCA),4 which prohibited any form of non-
consensual wiretapping by any person without government
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 456-457.
43. Id. at 455.
44. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 57-59 (holding that even if the police had
trespassed onto defendant's property there was no illegal search and seizure of the defendant's
property when the defendant fled and abandoned the whiskey jugs in an open field).
45. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. Justice Taft, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
literal language of the fourth amendment could not be expanded to include telephone wires
that could extend around the world as part of a person's house or curtilage. Id. at 465.
46. See id. at 466. Cf. id. at 478-479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (The framers of the
Constitution sought to protect Americans in their thoughts, beliefs, and emotions from
government invasion. The tapping of a telephone is an evil far greater than a general warrant
as a tool for espionage.); id. at 475-476 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State
Trials, 1030, 1066) ("It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers
that constitutes the essence of this offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has not been forfeited
by his conviction fo some public offense"); id. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (although the
detection of criminals, and all available evidence to convict criminals is desirable, it is a lesser
evil to allow some criminals to go free than to permit the government to benefit from illegal
acts).
47. See id. at 466. The common-law rule of evidence does not exclude evidence that is
illegally obtained. Id. at 467: See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (the
application of the exclusionary rule applies only to the federal government).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934) amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1968).
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authorization. 49 However, the Supreme Court interpreted the FCA to
apply only in instances of physical trespass. 0 For example, in Gold-
man v. United States,51 the Supreme Court held that the placement
of a detectaphone52 on the wall of an adjoining room for the purpose
of recording conversations was not a search because there was no
physical trespass.5 3 And in Silverman v. United States 4 the Court
held that a spike mike 5 driven through a wall and touching the
heating duct of the defendant's house was a physical trespass;
56
therefore, any conversations the government recorded through the
use of the spike mike were obtained in violation of the FCA.Sl
In 1966, the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York 5 and Katz v.
United States 9 took a more active role in defining constitutional
standards for wiretap statutesA0 In Berger, New York police obtained
a judicially authorized wiretap order to record conversations taking
place in the office of a New York State Liquor Authority agent
l.6
On the basis of the evidence gained through this wiretap, police were
able to obtain a second judicially authorized wiretap order to record
conversations in the office of another Liquor Authority agent.6 2 Based
solely on the evidence gained by the police through these wiretaps,
49. See id. See also Nordone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (under the FCA,
the word "person" includes federal law enforcement officers). In the absence of clear
congressional intent to include federal law enforcement officers within the FCA, the Court
must exclude the evidence the government agents obtained in violation of the statute. Id.
50. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
51. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
52. A detectaphone is a telephone apparatus used for secretly listening to phone conver-
sations. WEBSTER's TnmD NEW INTERNATiONAL DICTiONARY 616 (1986).
53. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 135. The Court held that the conversations recorded by federal
agents were neither "communications," nor were the conversations "intercepted" under the
FCA. Id. at 133.
54. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
55. A spike mike is a microphone with a foot long spike attached to it that must be
hammered into a wall and touching the area from which conversations are to be intercepted.
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506.
56. Id. at 512.
57. Id. at 510-11. Goldman and Olmstead are not overruled since those decisions were
premised on the lack of a physical intrusion into a constitutionaly protected area. The sole
concern of the Court should not be local property rules or distinctions about the types of
electronic equipment used, but on whether an individual's privacy has been invaded. Id. at
513 (Douglas, J., concurring).
58. 388 U.S. 41 (1966).
59. 389 U.S. 347 (1966).
60. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 59-63 (discussing criteria required for a statute to pass
constitutional scrutiny while striking down a New York wiretap statute); Katz, 389 U.S. at
353 (overruling the trespass doctrine of Olmstead and Goldman).
61. Berger, 388 U.S. at 45.
62. Id.
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the New York District Attorney secured a conviction against the
defendant as a "go between" in a bribery conspiracy.63
The Berger Court examined whether New York's permissive wiretap
statute violated the defendant's fourth amendment right against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 64 In striking down the New York
State wiretap statute, the Court concluded that the language was too
broad because it allowed trespassory intrusions into constitutionally
protected areas s.6  In addition, the Court set forth nine criteria that
a nonconsensual wiretap statute must meet in order to be constitu-
tional under the fourth amendment.
66
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Katz, which further defined
constitutional standards for wiretap statutes. 67 The Katz Court re-
jected the trespass doctrine of Olmstead and its progeny, and held
that the invasion of any place where a person has a legitimate and
justifiable expectation of privacy constitutes a search under the fourth
amendment. 68 In Katz, FBI agents placed a microphone on top of a
telephone booth from which the defendant made personal telephone
calls. 69 The FBI agents listened to and recorded only the defendant's
end of each conversation. 70 Based on the FBI's wiretap evidence, the
defendant was convicted in a federal district court for illegally
transmitting wagering information. 71 The Court of Appeals held that
since there was no physical invasion into the area occupied by the
defendant, there was no search within the meaning of the fourth
63. Id.
64. Id. at 43-44.
65. Id. at 44.
66. Id. at 58-63. Justice Clark writing for the majority established the following consti-
tutional standards: (1) An affiant must have probable cause to believe a crime is being or has
been committed; (2) an order must specifically describe the particular communications to be
intercepted and the scope of the executing officer's conduct; (3) the court order can only
authorize limited intrusions for each showing of probable cause; (4) the court order must be
executed promptly; (5) conversations seized must have some connection to the crime under
investigation; (6) after the conversation sought after is obtained, a court order must terminate;
(7) a different showing of probable cause is needed to extend the wiretap; (8) exigent
circumstances must be shown to justify the wiretap; and (9) conversations seized must be
returned to the judge issuing the order before being used. Id.
67. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
68. Id. at 353. The fact that a listening device placed on top of a phone booth from
which the defendant was placing a call did not physically penetrate the wall cannot have any
Constitutional significance. Id. The fourth amendment requires (1) that a person exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that the expectation is one that society is prepared
to accept as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 348.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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amendment. 72 The United States Supreme Court, in overruling Olm-
stead and the Court of Appeals, held that the government had
conducted a "search" without first obtaining a valid search warrant
within the meaning of the fourth amendment by invading an area
where the defendant had a legitimate and reasonable expectation of
privacy. 73 Additionally, the Court held that government agents need
to obtain a warrant approved by a neutral and detached magistrate
before commencing any type of electronic surveillance.
74
Following Berger and Katz, Congress passed Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) 71 in
an attempt to aid federal law enforcement officers in the battle
against organized crime. Title III enables federal law enforcement
officials to obtain judicially authorized wiretap orders to conduct
electronic surveillance in accordance with the Berger and Katz stan-
dards.76 Because Congress based Title III on the criteria set out in
Berger and Katz, the Act as a whole has not been challenged
successfully in the federal courts.77 Today, twenty-nine states and the
District of Columbia have statutes authorizing the interception of
wire communications modeled after Title 111.78
72. Id. at 348-49.
73. Id. at 358-59.
74. Id. at 356-59. Even though the FBI agents acted with restraint in only recording
defendant's half of the conversation, the predetermination of the scope of the search was
made by the agents and not a neutral magistrate. Id. at 356.
75. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act; Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 218 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)) (federal statutes authorizing wiretapping
by federal law enforcement officers). See generally, U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2112,
2157 (the purpose of Title III is to fight organized crime in the United States).
76. See. 1968 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2112, 2157.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
Title III meets the Berger and Katz standards), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United
States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 526-531 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding Title III not facially
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464,
467-468 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that provisions of Title III which permit limited electronic
surveillance must be under strict judicial supervision to satisfy the Constitution), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
78. See Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN §§ 13-30001-13-3011 (Supp. 1988); COLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 16-15-101 through 15-150104 (Vest Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-41a-54-
41t; DEL. CODE AtNN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1988); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23:541-23:556 (1981); FLA.
STAT. AN. §§ 934.01-934.10 (West Supp. 1988), GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-64 (1988); HAW.
REv. STAT. §§ 803-41-803-50 (1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701-18-6716 (1987); KAN. Cams. PROC.
CODE. ANN. §§ 22-2514-22-2516 (Vernon 1980); LA. CODE Camt. PROC. ANN. art. 15:1301-
15:1312 (West 1981); MD. CRIM. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401-10-401(2) (1988); MASS. GEM. LAws
ANN. ch. 272 99 (West Supp. 1988); Mi 4. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01-626A-23 (West Supp.
1988); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 86-701-86-707 (1987); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 179.410-179.515 (1988);
N.H. REv. STAT. AN. §§ 570-A:1-570-A:ll (Supp 1988); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-
1-156A-26 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 830-12-2-830-12-11; N.Y. CRaM. PRoc.
CODE §§ 700.05-700.70 (McKinney's 1984); OaLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 176.7 (West 1983); OR.
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C. The Politics of S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83: The End of a Twenty-
Year Struggle
In 1970, two years after Congress passed Title III, California State
Senator Nejedly introduced the first wiretap bill in the California
Senate.79 In the eighteen years that followed, ten other wiretap bills
were introduced, but all failed passage.80 In 1986, Senator Presley
introduced S.B. 83.81 This first version of S.B. 83 allowed a judge
to issue a wiretap order based upon probable cause that a person
was committing, had committed, or would commit murder,12 kidnap-
ping,83 robbery, 84 certain drug offenses,85 or any crime endangering
life. 6 Having passed the Senate, however, S.B. 83 died in the
Assembly Committee on Public Safety and was placed on the inactive
file in 1987.87
In 1988, the Senate reconsidered S.B. 83, but it was referred back
to the Assembly Committee on Public Safety where it seemed likely
to die again.8 s However, Senator Presley, the author of S.B. 83,
deleted the contents of a prison construction bill (S.B. 1499) and
added the contents of S.B. 83 as amended on March 28, 1988 in
order to bypass the Assembly Committee on Public Safety.8 9 The
Assembly then passed a motion to allow the amended version of
REv. STAT. §§ 133.721-133.739 (1985); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Purdon 1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-5.1-1-12-5.1-16 (Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-35A-
1-25A-35A-34 (1988); TEx. CMIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 77-54(A)-I-77-54(A)-ll (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-61-19.2-70.3 (Supp. 1988);
WASH. REv. CODE. § 9.73.040 (1988); WXis. STAT. §§ 968.27-968.33 (Supp. 1988).
79. S.B. 185, 1969-70 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.
80. See S.B. 159, 1984-85 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; S.B. 1020, 1980-81 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.;
A.B. 931, 1978-79 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; S.B. 684, 1976-77 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; S.B. 64,
1976-77 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; S.B. 1976, 1976-77 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; S.B. 2089, 1975-76
Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; S.B. 1081, 1971-72 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.; S.B. 228, 1970-71 Cal. Leg.,
Reg. Sess.
81. S.B. 83, 1986-87 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (as introduced Dec. 11, 1986).
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988) (definition of murder).
83. Id. § 207 (definition of kidnapping).
84. Id. § 211 (definition of robbery).
85. See note 7 and accompanying text.
86. S.B. 83, 1986-87 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., § 629.02 (as introduced Dec. 11, 1986).
87. SENATE RECESS HISTORY, 1987-88 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., Oct. 5, 1988, at 44.
88. Id.
89. Compare S.B." 1499, 1986-87 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (as amended Sept. 3, 1987) (amended
Sept. 3, 1987) (permitting the state to obtain a wiretap warrant to investigate murder, robbery,
kidnapping, certain drug offenses, and crimes endangering life); with S.B. 1499, 1987-88 Cal.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (as amended Apr. 7, 1988) (permitting the state to obtain a wiretap warrant
only for serious drug offenses).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
S.B. 1499 to be set for special order90 on April 14, 1988. 91 Before
consideration of S.B. 1499, the Assembly granted Assemblymember
Hannigan's motion for unanimous consent to recess in order to allow
the Democratic Caucus to meet in the Assembly lounge. 92 This recess
allowed the proponents of S.B. 1499 to muster support for the bill
before voting. After the recess, Assemblymember Hannigan, along
with the coalition of the "Gang of Five" conservative democrats93
and two republican assemblymembers, made a demand for previous
question of the passage of S.B. 1499. 94 This procedure effectively
terminated all debate and required the Assembly to vote on the
pending question-S.B. 1499. The Assembly then passed S.B. 1499
by a vote of 49 to 19. 95 After the Governor signed the bill, the
Secretary of State chaptered S.B. 1499 which is codified in California
Penal Code sections 629 through 631.96 After passing S.B. 1499, the
legislature recalled S.B. 83 from the inactive file to correct drafting
errors in S.B. 1499, then passed S.B. 83 as amended.
97
II. THE PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF S.B. 1499 AND S.B. 83
A. The Procedure For Obtaining a Wiretap Order Under S.B.
1499
The explosion of illegal drug trading is the main reason the
legislature passed S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83. Today, sophisticated and
highly organized cartels dominate large scale sales of illegal drugs in
90. CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY, STANDING RULES OF THE ASSEMBLY § 88 (1987) (a matter set
before the assembly as a special order may only be debated as to the propriety of setting the
main question as a special order of business). Id.
91. 1987-88 CAL. ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY JoumrP , at 6818 (April 14, 1988).
92. Id.
93. CAL. J., Apr., 1988, at 152. The Gang of Five is a group of California Democrat
assemblymembers who openly opposed Speaker of the Assembly Willie Brown's leadership at
the beginning of the 1987-88 Assembly regular session. The five assemblymembers are Areias,
Calderon, Condit, Eaves, and Peace. Id.
94. 1987-88 CAL. ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY JoURNAL, at 6819 (April 14, 1988) (Assembly
members Elder, Hannigan, Nolan, N. Waters, and Statham make a demand for previous
question). See CAL. ASSEMBLY, STANDING RULEs OF THE ASSEMBLY 87 (1987) (if five members
make a demand for previous question, and a majority consents, then a bill will be voted on
without further debate of the question pending).
95. See 1987-88 CAL. ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY JouRNA, at 6819.
96. SENATE REcEss HisTORY, 1987-88 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., Oct. 5, 1988, at 44.
97. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1374, see 1, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629.32,
631).
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the United States. 98 Drug organizations reap gigantic profits and use
unscrupulous means to protect their interests. 99 Not surprisingly,
California has become a major hub of illegal drug activity. 1" A
recent federal government report has identified Los Angeles as a
major national drug importation and distribution center.' 0' In addi-
tion, San Francisco police worry that rock cocaine (crack) dealers
are taking over entire neighborhoods. 02
Federal government officials, in their attempt to curtail illegal drug
trading, have found that investigating and prosecuting the leaders of
organized criminal entities is difficult and frustrating. 03 As a result
of this problem, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.104 Title III enables federal law
enforcement officers to obtain judicial warrants for conducting elec-
tronic surveillance.0 5 In enacting Title III, Congress was aware that
leaders of organized crime syndicates shield their criminal activities
by purposefully failing to keep formal business records and by
intimidating potential witnesses against them. 0 6 These tactics prevent
law enforcement officials from obtaining admissible trial evidence to
support convictions against organized crime leaders.'0 7 In addition,
Congress understood that large criminal organizations depend on the
telephone to organize and conduct illegal activities, and that wiretap-
ping is an effective way to obtain admissible trial evidence.'08
Because of increased drug trading and increased difficulties in
convicting drug kingpins, the California Legislature enacted S.B.
1499 to aid California law enforcement officers. 0 9 S.B. 1499 allows
judicially supervised wiretapping for use in investigating serious drug
98. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, CONTROLLING DRUG ABUSE: A STATUS
REPORT (March 1988).
99. Id.
100. In the 1980's federal law enforcement officials in Los Angeles have been seizing
greater amounts of illegal drugs due to the flight of major drug dealers from law enforcement
crackdowns in Florida and New York. Sacramento Bee, Dec. 19, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
101. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF Tim UNITED STATES, CONTROLLING DRUG ABUSE supra note
101 at 25.
102. Id. at 26.
103. 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2112, 2157-2161.
104. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 218 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 2112, 2157-2161.
108. Id.
109. California State Assembly, Senate Third Reading Report on S.B. 1499 at 6 reprinted
in CAL. DIST. ATTY's Assoc., INTERCEPTION OF WIRE COMMUNICATIONS: CALIFORNIA DISTRICT
ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION (1988).
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offenses." 0 The only offenses that state law enforcement officers may
obtain a judicially authorized wiretap order are for the manufacture,
sale, possession for sale, transportation, and importation of cocaine,
heroin, PCP, methamphetamines or their analogs, when the amount
of the substance exceeds three pounds by weight or ten gallons by
liquid volume."'
To obtain a judicially authorized wiretap order, a law enforcement
officer must file a written application requesting judicial authorization
to intercept wire communications with the presiding superior court
judge or a judge designated 12 by the presiding superior court judge."'
Each application must contain the following information: (1) The
identity of the applicant and the supervisor who authorizes the
application;' 1 4 (2) the identity of the law enforcement agency executing
the order;" 5 (3) the facts that the applicant believes justify wiretap-
ping;1 6 (4) the time authorized for the interception of wire commu-
nications; 117 and (5) the facts relating to any known previous wiretap
applications to a state or federal judge." 8
A judge can only approve an application and issue an order"9
authorizing wiretapping if exigent circumstances exist 20 and there is
probable cause to believe the following: (1) A person is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit certain drug offenses;' 2' (2) a
conspiracy to commit certain drug offenses exists;'1 (3) conversations
relating to the named illegal activities will be intercepted; 23 and (4)
the person named on the affidavit uses or is about to use the place
or facility to be wiretapped to commit the named drug offenses. 2
4
110. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. I11, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE 629.02)
111. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02(a)(1)).
112. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02 (the presiding superior court judge names
the other judge)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629(a),(b)).
115. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629(c)).
116. The facts must include; (1) The particular offense under investigation; (2) the existence
of exigent circumstances requiring wiretapping; (3) the type of communications to be inter-
rupted; (4) the nature and place of the interception; and (5) any known information about
the identity of the person whose conversations will be intercepted. Id. (enacting CAL. PE3NAL
CODE § 629(d)).
117. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629(e)).
118. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE 629(f)).
119. Id.
120. An applicant must state that normal investigative techniques have been or will be
useless or dangerous. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629(d), 629.02(d)).
121. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02(a)). See also supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
122. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02(a)(2)).
123. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02(c)).
124. Id.
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A judge may approve an oral application for a wiretap order only
if grounds exist upon which the judge would normally grant a written
petition for a wiretap order. 12 In addition, a judge must find probable
cause to believe that an investigation requires emergency action
26
and that substantial danger to life or limb' 27 justifies the immediate
interception of wire communications.' 28
Once approved, an order must be executed promptly in the least
intrusive manner possible. 129 The method of recording conversations
must allow for a system of immediate verification of the originality
and authenticity of the audiotape. 30 Upon termination of the order,
all evidence gained through wiretapping must be brought to the
issuing judge to be sealed.' 31 Within ninety days of the termination
of the order or extension order, the issuing judge must cause the
persons named on the application and any other known persons
whose conversations were intercepted, to be served notice of the
entry of the order, the beginning and ending dates of the order, and
the recording of conversations. 32 The issuing judge has the discretion
to grant a motion to inspect the contents of the evidence under
seal. 133 Moreover, evidence may not be used in any trial, hearing, or
proceeding' 34 unless each party has been given a transcript of the
recorded conversations and a copy of the application and court order
authorizing the wiretap.1
35
B. The Constitutionality of the Wiretapping Statutes
Both Berger and Katz clearly control the extent to which the
government may violate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
125. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.06(a)(1)).
126. See id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.06(a)(2)). See also Nabozny v. Marshall,
781 F.2d 83, 83-85 (6th Cir. 1986) (an emergency existed allowing the police to use electronic
surveillance when suspects kidnapped a bank manager and attempted to extort money from
the bank).
127. See (1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 11l, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.06(a)(2)).
128. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.06).
129. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CoDE § 629.08).
130. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.14). The recording equipment must be able to
pick up and measure the length of interceptions. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.18). A judge must also cause to be served notice
of an application to intercept wire communications that has been refused. Id.
133. Id. The government may make an ex-parte showing of good cause to postpone the
serving of the inventory. Id. The judge may postpone the serving of notice only for the time
needed to achieve the purposes of the delay. Id.
134. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.20). Wiretap evidence may always be used in a
grand jury hearing. Id.
135. Id.
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context of electronic surveillance.1 36 Consequently, Congress relied
on Berger and Katz for guidance to create legislation'3 7 that would
not violate the fourth amendment.138 Since the California Legislature
relied on Title III for guidance when it enacted S.B. 1499 and S.B.
83, these bills should survive future fourth amendment challenges to
the extent that they are like those parts of Title III that have already
survived challenge. 39 To the extent that S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 have
no Title III counterparts, S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 must still pass
constitutional scrutiny. Any constitutional weighing of S.B. 1499 and
S.B. 83 must be by the nine minimum constitutional standards set
out in Berger and the warrant requirement under Katz.
40
1. Probable Cause Requirements
Under Berger, an affiant must show that probable cause exists to
believe that a crime "has been or is being committed.' ' 14' Senate bill
1499 requires that an affiant provide a complete factual basis justi-
fying a belief that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed
before a judge may approve a wiretap order. 42 In addition, S.B.
1499 prohibits the authorization of a wiretap order unless a magistrate
determines that probable cause exists to believe the following: (1) A
person has committed, is committing, or will commit a specified drug
offense; (2) a conspiracy exists to commit any of the named drug
offenses; (3) communications concerning the above illegal activities
will be obtained through electronic surveillance; and (4) the person
named on the affidavit uses or will use the place to be tapped. 4
3
The provisions of S.B. 1499 are identical to the language in Title
III. 1' Although an affiant must show that probable cause exists to
136. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1966); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
137. 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMm. NEWS 2112, 2156-2157.
138. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. CoNsr. amend IV.
139. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
141. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1966).
142. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629) (outlining
procedures for application for wiretap warrant).
143. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02) (entering an order authorizing electronic
surveillance).
144. Compare id. with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b) (1988).
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believe that a crime, "has been or is being committed,"'1 45 at least
one federal court has held that the phrase "is about to be commit-
ted, ' 146 in Title III is constitutional. 47 Further, since Title III has
survived all facial probable cause constitutional challenges, S.B. 1499
is almost certainly constitutional. 4 8
2. Particularity of the Order and the Scope of the Executing
Officer's Authority in Executing the Wiretapping Order
Under Berger a judge must specify on each order the particular
communications to be intercepted and the scope of the executing
officer's authority in executing the wiretap order. 49 The Berger Court
stated that requiring the government to specifically describe the
conversations to be intercepted limits the authority of the executing
officer and prevents the government from conducting general
searches. 50 Subsequent to Berger, the courts, aware that describing
a future conversation with complete accuracy is impossible,' 5' have
held that a full and complete description of the offense to be
investigated sufficiently defines the type of conversations the govern-
ment may seize.
52
S.B. 1499 adopts the language of Title III and requires that a law
enforcement officer describe in the affidavit the particular conver-
sations to be intercepted. 53 Additionally, S.B. 1499 requires the judge
to describe the particular conversations to be intercepted in the
145. Berger, 388 U.S. at 55.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(i) (1968).
147. The purpose of Title III is to gain evidence of crimes committed and to prevent the
commission of future crimes. United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 27 (Ist Cir. 1983). The
determination of probable cause is what is important, not when the criminal conduct occured.
Common sense and reasoning would lead a reasonable judge to authorize a search warrant
based on a reliable informant's statment that the plans, tools, and weapons to be used in a
future crime are located at a certain place. Id.
148. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 254-259 (1978); United States v. Bailey, 607
F.2d 237, 240.241 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Martin,
599 F.2d. 880, 883-884 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711, 713 (8th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 152-170 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United
States v. Argresa, 541 F. 2d 690, 696-698 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Feldman, 535 F.2d.
1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d.
1262, 1273 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977).
149. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 57 (1966).
150. Id. at 59.
151. J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2-25 (1986).
152. Id.
153. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. Ill, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629(d),
629.04(c)).
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order. 15 4 Also like Title III, S.B. 1499 requires that each order
authorizing wiretapping particularly describe (1) any known infor-
mation relating to the identity of the persons whose conversations
are to be intercepted, (2) where the authorized interception will take
place, (3) the illegal activities under investigation, and (4) the length
of time for which the order is authorized. 55 Moreover, S.B. 1499
requires the executing officer to submit a written progress report to
the issuing judge every seventy-two hours.
56
Federal courts have held that Title III satisfies the Berger require-
ment that the affidavit and order specifically describe the conversa-
tions to be intercepted.- 7 Since the Title III requirements limiting
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant are identical to
S.B.1499, these sections almost certainly satisfy the particularity
standards described in Berger.""
3. Probable Cause Requirement for Additional Searches
Under Berger, the government may continue wiretapping after
seizing a conversation of the type it seeks only if it establishes
probable cause to believe additional conversations will occur. 59 In
striking down New York's permissive wiretap statute, the Berger
Court criticized the statute for allowing a judge to authorize a wiretap
order that allowed the government to sustain a series of intrusions
for up to sixty days based on a single determination of probable
cause.160 Despite the Court's concern that a prolonged government
wiretap might create a series of searches based upon a single deter-
mination of probable cause, Congress specifically enacted a thirty
154. See id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629(d)) (listing information required on an
affidavit); id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.04(c)) (requiring that communications to be
intercepted are specified on the order).
155. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.04(a)-(c),(e)).
156. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.10).
157. See United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419
U.S. 1056 (1974); United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d. 554, 565 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d. 974, 983 (4th Cir. 1973).
158. See J. CARR, supra note 154, §§ 2-24, 2-27. See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 57 (1966). The objective of the particularity requirements is to define the government's
justification for invading a constitutionally protected area and to protect unauthorized areas
from intrusion. Id.
159. Berger, 388 U.S.at 59-60.
160. Id. at 57, 59. The majority was concerned that a statute may permit an invasion of
a constitutionally protected area by general warrant which is in contravention to the protections
provided by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 64.
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day restriction on electronic surveillance in Title 111.161 This restriction
allows the judge to authorize a wiretap order for up to thirty days
based upon a single showing of probable cause. 62 One federal court
has held that this thirty day time limit does not constitute a general
warrant search in violation of the fourth amendment.
163
S.B. 1499 is similar to Title III in that it limits electronic surveil-
lance to the time necessary to achieve the government's purpose and
places a thirty day time limit on electronic surveillance. 64 Under S.B.
1499, however, once the government intercepts a conversation of the
type it seeks, the government may not continue electronic surveillance
unless the affiant establishes that there is probable cause to believe
that additional illegal conversations will occur. 165 Since this require-
ment under S.B. 1499 is more restrictive than the similar provision
under Title III, it should pass constitutional muster.
4. The Government Must Execute the Wiretap Order Promptly
and in the Least Intrusive Manner
Berger requires every wiretap order to contain a provision that the
government execute the wiretap order promptly and in the least
intrusive manner. 166 In enacting Title III, Congress specifically in-
cluded a provision that all wiretap orders must contain a requirement
that the government execute the order promptly and in the least
intrusive manner. 67 Like Title III, S.B. 1499 specifically requires that
every order and extension order contain a provision that each au-
thorized wiretap will be executed "as soon as practicable" and in
the least intrusive manner with respect to unrelated conversations.
168
On its face, these requirements satisfy the "least intrusive manner"
requirement under Berger because they require each order to contain
the least intrusive manner provision.
161. See 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) (1968). An order may only authorize electronic surveillance for
the time necessary to obtain the objective of the search but no longer than 30 days. Id.
162. Id.
163. See United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d. 524, 531 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420
U.S. 932 (1974) (the time period does not make Title III facially unconstitutional as a general
warrant).
164. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.08).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1966).
165. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629).
166. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1966).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1968).
168. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.08).
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However, whether the government's conduct actually constituted
"the least intrusive manner" requires the courts to employ the
analysis set forth in Scott v. United States.169 In Scott, federal agents
obtained a judicially authorized wiretapping order under Title III to
investigate a drug selling conspiracy involving several suspects. 170 The
wiretap order contained Title III's language requiring that the exe-
cuting officers conduct the electronic surveillance promptly in the
least intrusive manner to the persons named in the order.'17 At the
end of the surveillance period, the government arrested twenty-two
persons and indicted fourteen, including defendant Scott. 172 Before
Scott's trial, the district court suppressed all the government's wiretap
evidence because the federal officers intercepted all conversations
even though only forty percent of the calls were shown to be narcotics
related. '73
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial
court to consider not only the percentage of narcotics related calls,
but also the reasonableness of the officers' actions with respect to
the purpose of the wiretap order and the officers' knowledge of the
information available at the time of the interception. 74 On remand,
the district court ruled that the government's wiretap evidence should
be suppressed because the federal agents knew of the least intrusive
manner requirement, but never attempted to comply with it. "71 Once
again the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the
district court 76 holding that the suppression motion must be based
on an objective assessment of the actual interceptions and not on
the subjective intent of the officers executing the wiretap order. 77
The government's wiretap evidence was eventually admitted and Scott
was convicted of conspiracy to sell and purchase narcotics. 78
In his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, Scott argued
that Title III required federal officers to make a good faith effort
to meet the least intrusive manner requirements when executing a
169. 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
170. Scott, 436 U.S. at 131. The affidavit alleged that probable cause existed to believe
that nine named people were involved in the conspiracy. Id.
171. Id. at 131-32.
172. Id. at 132.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 132-33.
175. Id. at 133.
176. Id. at 134.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 134-35.
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wiretap order.179 Scott further argued that the government's failure
to make a good faith effort required the court to suppress any
wiretap evidence.8 0 The Supreme Court held that whether an officer
has executed a wiretap order in the least intrusive manner depends
on the circumstances of each case.' Under Scott, a trial court must
determine whether an officer used the least intrusive manner by
focusing on whether the officer's conduct was reasonable in executing
a wiretapping order under Title III, rather than focusing on the
officer's subjective motives. 12 The Court explained that the reason-
ableness of an officer's conduct in executing a wiretap order depends
on the circumstances of the investigation.183 In finding the actions of
the officers in Scott reasonable, the Court relied on the following
factors: (1) The percentage of nonpertinent to pertinent calls inter-
cepted; (2) the circumstances of the wiretap; (3) the stage in the
investigation in which the calls were intercepted; and (4) the type of
use to which the telephone was put.
84
The least intrusive manner requirements of S.B. 1499 are identical
to the Title III least intrusive manner requirements that the Court
examined in Scott."5 Therefore, the California courts should apply
the Scott reasonableness test when examining the reasonableness of
a California law enforcement officer's conduct in executing a wire-
tapping order under S.B. 1499.186
5. The Government May Seize Only Criminal Conversations
Berger allows the government to seize only conversations having a
connection with the crime or crimes under investigation. 8 7 S.B. 1499
expressly prohibits the government from intercepting privileged'
179. Id. at 135.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 140.
182. Id. at 139.
183. Id. at 140.
184. Id. at 140-41.
185. Compare 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at.- (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.08)
with 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) (1968).
186. See infra note 185 and accompanying text (to determine reasonableness the Court
looked at the following factors: (1) the percentage on nonpertinent to pertinent calls intercepted;
(2) the circumstances of the wiretap; (3) when the calls were intercepted; and (4) the type of
use to which the telephone was put).
187. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1966).
188. CAL. Evm. CODE § 917 (West 1966) The opponent of the claim of privilege has the
burden of proof to show that any communication between a lawyer-client, physician-patient,
psychotherapist-patient, clergyman-penitent, or husband-wife was not priveleged. Id.
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communications. 18 9 Under S.B. 1499 if a law enforcement officer
acting in accordance with a judicially approved order, intercepts a
privileged communication, the officer must terminate the interception
for at least two minutes. 90 After the two minute period, an officer
may resume the interception up to thirty seconds to determine whether
the nature of the conversation is no longer privileged. 19' This moni-
toring process may continue until the conversation ends or is no
longer privileged. 192
These safeguards attempt to satisfy the requirements set out in
Berger that the government may seize only criminal conversations.'93
Because these safeguards are subject to the least intrusive manner
test in Scott, which requires an officer's conduct to be reasonable
under the circumstances, the government may be able to seize non-
criminal communications.194 For example, despite Berger, the Court
in Scott allowed the government to seize all telephone calls at the
beginning of the surveillance in order to identify and categorize
unrelated and privileged conversations. 195 Since almost all the calls
were ambiguous and difficult to characterize until the end of the
conversation, the Court held that the monitoring was not unreason-
able. 196
6. When a Wiretap Order Must Terminate
Under Berger electronic surveillance must cease once the govern-
ment seizes a conversation of the type specified in the wiretap order.' 9'
The Court was concerned that allowing an order to extend after the
government seized the communications of the type it sought would
give the government too much discretion in monitoring its own
activities. 198 Title III requires federal law enforcement officers to
cease electronic surveillance either after the government seizes a
189. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.30).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. Conversations must be recorded in a way so that a reviewing court could find
that the interruptions were also recorded. Id.
193. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1966).
194. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (emphasizing the objective aspect
of "reasonable").
195. Id. at 140.
196. Id. at 140-43.
197. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59-60.
198. Id. at 59-60.
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conversation of the type it seeks or at the time the order expires.1 99
Additionally, Title III requires federal law enforcement officers to
establish probable cause to believe additional criminal conversations
will occur before a judge can approve a wiretapping order that will
not cease after the government seizes a conversation of the type it
seeks.200 At least one federal court has held that the termination
requirements of Title III are constitutional. 201
S.B. 1499 adopts the same language as Title 111,202 which requires
electronic surveillance to cease either at the time the government
seizes a conversation of the type it seeks or on the date the order is
supposed to expire. 203 In addition, S.B. 1499 uses the same language
as Title III,204 which allows a judge to approve a wiretap order that
extends after the state seizes a conversation of the type it seeks as
long as the state establishes probable cause to believe that additional
criminal conversations will occur. 20 5 Consequently, S.B. 1499 should
not face any serious facial challenges under the United States Con-
stitution.
Like Title III, S.B. 1499 provides for extensive judicial oversight
to prevent potential police abuses.2°6 S.B. 1499 requires the govern-
ment to furnish a report to the issuing judge every seventy-two hours
stating the progress the government has made or an explanation why
no progress has been made to accomplish the goal of the order.
20 7
A judge must terminate the order if the government has made no
progress in the investigation, the government's explanation for lack
of progress is unsatisfactory, or the electronic surveillance is no
longer necessary. 23 Since these statutory protections are modeled
after Title III and effectively limit the discretion of the executing
officer, they are almost certainly constitutional.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1968).
200. Id. § 2518(I)(d).
201. United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 501 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918
(1973).
202. Compare 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE 929(e))
with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(I)(d), 2518(5) (1968).
203. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 11, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.08).
204. Compare id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE 629(e)) with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1968).
205. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629)
(application for authorization of electronic surveillance); id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 629.02) (order authorizing electronic surveillance); id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.08
(limitations on obtaining an extension order)).
206. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.10).
207. Id.
208. Id.
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7. The Government Must Show Probable Cause to Extend a
Wiretap Order
Under Berger a judge may extend a wiretapping order if the
government establishes that there are independent grounds for prob-
able cause to believe that additional criminal conversations will
occur.209 This means that the government cannot obtain an extension
order if it bases probable cause solely on the information contained
in the original application for a wiretap order. The textual language
of Title III does not specifically require the government to show an
independent basis for probable cause to believe future criminal con-
versations will occur before a judge can extend a wiretap order. 210
Instead, before a judge can extend a wiretap order under Title III,
the government must provide the judge with the current results of
the investigation or a reasonable explanation for not obtaining any
results. 211 At least one federal court has held that before a judge can
extend a wiretap order, the government must provide more than just
the original facts supporting the initial determination of probable
cause. 21
2
Like Title III, S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 do not require an independent
determination of probable cause to extend a wiretap order. 213 S.B.
1499 requires each application to include the number of conversations
intercepted, the results of the investigation, or a reasonable expla-
nation of a failure to intercept pertinent conversations. 21 4 The infor-
mation required in S.B. 1499 should satisfy the Berger probable cause
requirements since S.B. 1499 provides the judge with the necessary
information to make a neutral and detached determination of prob-
able cause based on the progress of the investigation. 215 In light of
the Katz standard requiring a predetermination of probable cause
before conducting electronic surveillance,2 1 6 California law enforce-
209. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1966).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982).
211. Id. § 2518(1)(f).
212. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (a magistrate must have
the necessary information in order to make an informed predetermination of probable cause),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1974).
213. See 1988 Stat. ch. 111, secs. 2-4 at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629-631);
1988 Stat. ch. 1374, secs. 1-3 at - (amending Cal. Penal Code §§ 629.32, 631). See also
supra note 214 and accompanying text.
214. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CoDE § 629(g).
215. Id.
216. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-359 (1967).
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ment officers will have to support an application for an extension
order with additional information before a judge will extend a wiretap
order.21 7
8. Exigent Circumstances Required
Berger requires the government to show that exigent circumstances
exist before a judge may approve or extend a wiretap order.218 The
Court felt that a wiretap order may be approved only if exigent
circumstances exist, since a wiretap order is highly intrusive and
permits the government to search without notifying the suspect.
219
Under Title III, a judge may not approve a wiretap order unless the
government shows that conventional investigative techniques most
likely will fail or are too dangerousY 0 In addition, Title III requires
the government to show an emergency situation exists before a judge
may approve an oral application for a wiretap order.22
The exigent circumstance language in S.B. 1499 is identical to the
exigent circumstance language in Title III.2 S.B. 1499 requires an
affiant to state, and a judge to find, that conventional investigative
techniques are, or most likely will be, ineffective or dangerous.m In
addition, a judge may approve an oral application only if the judge
finds probable cause to believe that an investigation requires emer-
gency action, 224 or that there is a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury225 if the judge does not authorize electronic surveil-
lance. "6 Since the federal courts have held that the exigent circum-
stance provision of Title III satisfies the exigent circumstance
217. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (a magistrate must have
the necessary information in order to make an informed predetermination of probable cause),
cert. denied 470 U.S. 1003 (1984).
218. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1966).
219. Id.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1982).
221. Id. § 2518(7)(a).
222. Compare 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2 at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 629.02(d)) with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1982).
223. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629,
629.02).
224. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
226. An oral order may not be authorized unless there are grounds for issuance. 1988 Cal.
Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.06(a)(1)). An order may be
issued on the condition that a written application be filed with the judge within 48 hours of
the issuance of the order. Id. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL
CODE § 629.06(b)).
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requirement in Berger, the analogous provisions in S.B. 1499 are
almost certainly constitutional. 227
9. Judge Must Review Evidence
Berger requires the government to turn over evidence obtained
through electronic surveillance to the issuing judge before the gov-
ernment uses the evidence.228 The Berger Court feared that the New
York statute gave the government too much discretion as to the use
of evidence without judicial supervision or adequate' protections. 2 9
In addressing these concerns, the California Legislature adopted
language from Title 111.230 Senate bill 1499 and S.B. 83 which require
the government, before using wiretap evidence, to turn over all
evidence obtained through wiretapping to the issuing judge for the
judge to inspect and seal. 23' The issuing judge must also cause all
those named on the application to be served notice of the entry of
the order, the period of authorized surveillance, and whether con-
versations were intercepted . 32 Moreover, evidence may not be used
in a criminal prosecution unless each party receives a transcript of
the conversations intercepted at least ten days before trial. 233 Since
the provisions of Title III requiring judicial inspection of evidence
have survived constitutional challenge, S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 should
also pass constitutional challenge. 234
PART III: LEGAL RAMImCATIONS
A. Remedies Under S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83
S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 require any wiretap evidence that the state
seizes in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment right against
227. See United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d. 764, 773 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d. 974, 981 (4th Cir, 1973).
228. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1966).
229. Id.
230. Compare 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE 629.14,
629.16, 629.18) with 18 U.S.C § 2518(8)(a), (b), (d) (1982).
231. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.14).
232. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.18).
233. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.20).
234. See United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976) (judicial inspection requirement
under Title III was not violated when judge did not receive the evidence until five months
after the surveillance ended and the government was able to establish an uninterrupted chain
of custody), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
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unreasonable searches and seizures to be inadmissible under the
federal exclusionary rule.235 In addition, S.B. 1499 provides a wiretap
victim with civil and criminal remedies for a violation of the wiretap
statute. 236 A person violating S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 may be impris-
oned for up to one year, fined up to $2,500, or both fined and
imprisoned. 237Finally, a wiretap victim whose rights are abrogated in
violation of S.B. 1499 may also have a civil cause of action against
any person who intercepts, uses, or discloses private communications,
and may recover actual and punitive damages along with reasonable
attorney and litigation costs.238 Any wiretapper in a criminal or civil
action, however, may assert a good faith reliance on a judicially
authorized court order as a complete defense.
23 9
B. Remedies Under the California Constitution
1. Exclusion Under Article 1, Section 1.
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution grants California
residents a substantive right to be free of unreasonable government
intrusion.2 40 S.B. 1499 may violate this right to privacy by enabling
state law enforcement officials to listen secretly to private telephone
conversations without the consent of either party to the conversa-
tion. 24' Nevertheless, even if the state violates a wiretap victim's right
to privacy, any relevant evidence the state obtains through wiretap-
ping may be admissible under article I, section 28(d). 242 Article I,
235. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch, 111, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.22).
See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (all evidence that the state obtains in violation
of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is inadmissible in a state court as
well as a federal court).
236. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 11I, sec. 2, at - (enacting CA. PENAL CODE § 629.34)
(criminal penalties); id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.36) (civil penalties).
237. Id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.34).
238. See id. (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.36). See also Malley v. Briggs 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1985) (a police officer will not be immune from civil liability if an objectively
reasonable and competent officer could conclude that probable cause to obtain a search warrant
was not present).
239. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 2 at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629.36,
629.41). See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 899 (1984) (exceptions to the "good
faith" rule).
240. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing the right to privacy as an inalienable right).
241. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 11, sec. 2, at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02).
242. CAL. Co NsT. art I, § 28(d) (right to truth-in-evidence provision (Proposition 8) requiring
that all relevant evidence be admitted in a criminal trial unless gained in violation of the
United States Constitution).
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section 28(d) requires California criminal courts to admit all relevant
evidence in criminal trials unless the federal exclusionary rule ap-
plies 243
In In re Lance W.,244 the California Supreme Court held that
under article I, section 28(d) a trial judge may suppress evidence in
a criminal trial only if the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution requires suppression.2 45 In In re Lance W., the defendant
was detained after police officers observed him dropping a plastic
baggie into a truck belonging to a stranger.2 6 The police officers
searched the vehicle without consent and without a search warrant,
and found the plastic baggie, which contained marijuana. 247 The
police arrested Lance, searched him, and found more marijuana.
248
At a later suppression hearing, he contended that the judicially
created California "vicarious exclusionary rule"24 9 gave him standing
to suppress the illegally seized evidence.2 0 The juvenile court held
that Lance had standing to object to the illegal search of the truck
because article I, section 28(d) abrogated the judicially created vicar-
ious exclusionary rule.2 1
The California Supreme Court held that article I, section 28(d)
eliminated judicially created exclusionary remedies but did not effect
the scope of substantive rights protected by the state and federal
constitutions.2 2 Furthermore, the court held that state created exclu-
sionary rules are not a proper remedy for enforcing state substantive
rights under the state constitution. 25 3
Since the California Supreme Court has held that state created
exclusionary rules are not an acceptable means of enforcing substan-
tive state rights, article I, section 1 probably will not prevent the
243. Id.
244. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
245. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (1985).
246. Id. at 880, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
247. Id. at 880, 694 P.2d at 748, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
248. Id.
249. The vicarious exclusionary rule gives a criminal defendant standing to object to the
state's use of evidence obtained by the police through an illegal search and seizure of a third
party. Id. at 880-81, 694 P.2d at 748, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 880, 694 P.2d at 748, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
252. See id. at 886-887, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (defendant's right must be
determined under the federal constitution and federal case law interpreting those rights). See
also B. Wrrxn, CALFoRMuA CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, § 23jj (Supp. 1985) (the sole basis of
exclusion under Proposition 8 is the fourth amendment).
253. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 887, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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government from using wiretap evidence obtained under S.B. 1499
in criminal trials.
2. Constitutionality of S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 Under Article I,
Section 1
Since a wiretap victim may not exclude relevant criminal evidence
based on independent state grounds, a wiretap victim must look for
another remedy if the state violates the wiretap victim's right to
privacy under the California Constitution. One way persons affected
by electronic surveillance under S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 may protect
their right to privacy under the California Constitution is by seeking
an injunction. Therefore, it is important to discuss whether S.B. 1499
and S.B. 83 are constitutional on their face under article I, section
1 of the California Constitution.
In White v. Daviss4 the California Supreme Court examined whether
governmental surveillance and data gathering activities were subject
to scrutiny under the privacy protections of article I, section 1 of
the California Constitution2 5 In Davis, police officers acted as
undercover agents by registering as students, attending classes, and
reporting their observations of faculty and student activities to the
police departmentY 6 White, a taxpayer, sought to enjoin the police
department from expending public funds to conduct covert surveil-
lance activities at the state university .2 7 The court, in overruling a
demurrer, held that covert police action surveillance was the type of
activity that the privacy provision of the California Constitution is
designed to prohibit 58 The court stated that the actions of the police
officers epitomized the type of government conduct that article I,
section 1 bans.259 Additionally, the court held that the privacy pro-
vision of article 1, section 1 created an enforceable right of privacy
for all people in California, 260 but that the state may justify an
254. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P. 2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
255. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
256. Id. at 762, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 773-777, 533 P.2d. at 234-35, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05.
259. If the information gathered by the police has no connection to any illegal activity,
the government has the burden of proving that a compelling state interest in eavesdropping
exists, Id. at 776, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
260. See id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (the ability to control the
circulation of personal information is fundamental to 15ersonal freedom). See also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 344, 350-351 (1967) (the fourth amendment does not provide a general
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invasion of a person's privacy by showing a legitimate and compelling
government interest.261 In Davis the legitimate state interest in gath-
ering information to prevent future crimes did not give the state the
power to conduct surveillance by any means. 262 Moreover, the court
determined that the federal Bill of Rights and the protections of the
California Constitution must determine the limits of permissable law
enforcement action.
263
In the context of police surveillance, however, California courts
have interpreted Davis to mean that a person's right to privacy under
article I, section 1 has been violated if the state unreasonably intrudes
into a person's subjective and objective reasonable expectation of
privacy. 2
64
Private telephone conversations clearly fall within the types of
activity where a person may have a subjective expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. What is not so clear
is whether the state's use of electronic surveillance to investigate large
scale drug rings will be reasonable. Because of the increasing problems
generated by growing drug sales in California, the state should be
able to establish that the investigation of high volume drug trading
constitutes a legitimate and compelling state interest. Furthermore,
considering the limited purpose and scope of S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83
in investigating serious drug offenses, the strict probable cause re-
quirements under S.B. 1499, and the extensive judicial oversight of
police conduct in executing a wiretapping order, the state should be
able to establish that the government's invasion of a person's privacy
in obtaining drug information within the scope of S.B. 1499 and
constitutional right to privacy, but protects citizens from certain forms of government intru-
sion). The protection of a person's general right to privacy is left to the law of each state.
Id. at 351.
261. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775-76, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106. See also Alarcon
v. Murphy, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1, 248 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1988) (a person's right to privacy has been
violated if a person's objectively reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed upon
by an unreasonable government intrusion); Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 584,
132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976) (use of an informant to gain information of specific criminal
activities does not violate the right to privacy).
262. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 766, 533 P.2d at 228, 120 Cal. Rptr at 99 (1975).
263. Id.
264. See People v. Crowson, 33 Cal. 3d, 623, 629, 660 P.2d 389, 392, 190 Cal. Rptr. 165,
168 (1983) (article I, section I has never been held to provide a broader privacy protection
than the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution); People v. Owens, 112 Cal.
App. 3d 441, 449, 169 Cal. Rptr. 359, 362 (1980) (search and seizure and privacy protections
of the California Constitution are to be considered coextensive in the context of police
surveillance); People v. Ayers, 51 Cal. App. 3d 370, 377, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283, 287 (1975)
(White v. Davis does not affect the application of the United States Constitutional standard
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
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S.B. 83 is reasonable. However, a court may grant injunctive relief
if the state's application of S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 violates article I,
section 1 of the California Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 marks a significant change
of policy in California regarding the detection and apprehension of
criminals. The magnitude of this change is reflected in the collision
course between the "truth in evidence" provision of article I, section
28(d) and the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed by article I,
section 1. This conflict pits people's legitimate expectation that their
phone conversations will be kept private against the state's need to
protect the public from the inherent dangers in the illegal drug trade.
Since S.B. 1499 and S.B. 83 are based on Title III and contain even
more restrictive provisions than the federal wiretap statute, the sta-
tutes will probably withstand any facial federal constitutional chal-
lenges. And considering the extent of the drug problem in California's
cities and the limited types of crimes that fall under S.B. 1499, the
state will probably be able to overcome the state constitutional burden
of showing a compelling state interest to invade the privacy rights
of a limited class of individuals.
Bruce T. Flynn
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
APPENDIX
Code Sections Affected
SB 1499 (Presley); 1988 STAT. Ch. 111
Penal Code §§ 629,629.02, 629.04, 629.06, 629.08, 629.10, 629.12,
629.14, 629.16, 629.18, 629.20, 629.22, 629.24, 629.26, 629.28,
629.30, 629.32, 629.34, 629.36, 629.38, 629.39, 629.40, 629.41,
629.42, 629.44, 629.46, 629.48, 631 (new).
SB 83 (Presley); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1374
Penal Code § 631 (amended).
